Social Security and Public Welfare by Teple, Edwin R.
Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 11 | Issue 3
1960
Social Security and Public Welfare
Edwin R. Teple
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Edwin R. Teple, Social Security and Public Welfare, 11 Wes. Res. L. Rev. 420 (1960)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol11/iss3/25
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
. . . the rules relating to the law of fraud [and] misrepresentation
. . . shall apply to contracts to sell and sales of goods.' ' 14
CHATTEL MORTGAGES
In Modern Finance Company v. Reynolds, 5 the Court of Appeals
for Franklin County held that Ohio Revised Code section 1319.07,
which requires a ten-day notice to be given to the mortgagor by the
mortgagee prior to seizure and sale of personal property, does not
require such notice to be given to a co-maker of a note who is not the
mortgagor of the property to be subjected to seizure and sale, but
who would be subject to civil action for the collection of a deficiency
judgment rendered against him if the proceeds recovered from the
sale of the mortgaged property did not satisfy the amount due upon
the note.
SHELDON I. BERNS
SOCIAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC WELFARE
LABOR DISPUTE DISQUALIFICATION
A number of important decisions rendered by the Ohio courts
with respect to questions arising under the state Unemployment Com-
pensation Act,' have been reported during the past year.
One of the most important of these relates to the interpretation
of the word "establishment" as it is used in the labor dispute disquali-
fication contained in the Ohio Unemployment Compensation law.2
The case is Idamski v. State,3 decided by the Court of Appeals of
Lucas County. An earlier decision, rendered by the Court of Ap-
peals of Muskingum County, was also reported for the first time last
year.4 In the latter case, the court of appeals had overruled a deci-
sion by the common pleas court favorable to the claimants.'
Briefly and unalterably,6 the Ohio Unemployment Compensation
law disqualifies from receiving benefits any claimant who has lost or
left his employment by reason of a labor dispute, other than a lock-
out, at the factory, establishment, or other premises at which he was
employed. The Champion Spark Plug Company, the employer in
the Adamski case, produces spark plugs which are assembled at its
main plant in Toledo, Ohio, using ceramic insulators which are made
at a plant in Hamtramck, Michigan, a distance of approximately sixty
miles from the main plant. The workers at the Hamtramck plant,
represented by Local 272 of the UAW, went on strike January 10,
1956, over unsettled issues of wages and other related matters in-
14. For a further discussion of this case, see 11 WEsT. REs. L. REV. 496 (1960).
15. 108 Ohio App. 535, 161 N.E.2d 240 (1958).
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volved in negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement.
There was no strike at the main plant, where the workers were rep-
resented by an entirely different local, Local 12, but the supply of
insulators on hand at the main plant began to run out late in Janu-
ary, and on February 3 the bulk of the labor force at the Toledo
plant was laid off by the company. By the application of the so-
called functional integrality test, the majority of the court held that
the Hamtramck plant and the Toledo plant were part of the same
"establishment"; therefore, the labor dispute disqualification provi-
sion of the Ohio act was applicable. The decision of the Ohio Ad-
ministrator, denying benefits to the claimants in Toledo, was upheld.
This decision, along with that of the Muskingum County Court of
Appeals in McGee v. Timkin Roller Bearing Company, pretty dearly
aligns Ohio with a few other states which have similarly extended the
disqualifying effect of this particular provision, and represents the
minority view on the issue presented.8 A majority of the states have
refused to give similar effect to the "functional integration" argu-
ment, and have applied a much dearer and more natural physical
proximity test.9
The majority of the court in the Adamski case was obviously
somewhat nonplused by the decision of the Michigan Supreme Court
in Park v. Appeal Board,10 which reversed a circuit court decision up-
1. Omo REv. CODE §§ 4141.01-.99.
2. OHIo REV. CODE 5 4141.29.
3. 108 Ohio App. 198, 161 NXE.2d 907 (1959). A companion case, Bahnsoz v. State, was
decided at the same time, motions to certify denied, May 20, 1959.
4. McGee v. Timkin Roller Bearing Co., 161 N.E.2d 905 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
5. For a brief discussion of the lower court's decision see Teple, Social Security and Public
Welfare, Survey of Ohio Law - 1955, 7 WEsT. RES. L. REv. 321, 322 (1956).
6. See Cornell v. Bailey, 163 Ohio St. 50, 125 N.E.2d 323 (1955), cited in Teple, Social
Security and Public Welfare, Survey of Ohio Law - 1955, 7 WEST. RES. L. REv. 321, 322
(1956).
7. OIO REv. CoDE § 4141.29(C) (2).
8. The only cases which give any support to this view at the present time are: Mountain
States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Sakrison, 71 Ariz. 219, 225 P.2d 707 (1950); Ford Motor Co. v.
Abercrombie, 207 Ga. 464, 62 S.E.2d 209 (1950); Spielman v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 Wis.
240, 295 N. W. 1 (1940). General Motors Corp. v. Mulquin, 134 Conn. 118, 55 A.2d 732
(1947), gives faint support to this view by holding that two "plants" 18 miles apart might
constitute a single "factory," but adopts a narrower view of the term "establishment." Mat-
son Terminals, Inc. v. California Employment Comm'n, 24 Cal. 2d 695, 151 P.2d 202 (1944),
sometimes included with this group, involved dock workers assigned through a union hiring
hall, who were disqualified when the dock at which they worked was struck, a totally differ-
ent situation.
9. Ford Motor Co. v. Kentucky Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 243 S.W.2d 657
(Ky. 1951); Ford Motor Co. v. Division of Employment Sec., 326 Mass. 757, 96 N.E.2d 859
(1951); Park v. Appeal Board, 355 Mich. 103, 94 N.W.2d (1959); Nordling v. Ford Motor
Co., 231 Minn. 68, 42 N.W.2d 576 (1950); Ford Motor Co. v. New Jersey Department of
Labor & Indus., 5 N.J. 494, 76 A.2d 256 (1950); Nachcinski v. Ford Motor Co., 277 App.
Div. 634, 102 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1951); Ford Motor Co. v. Board of Review, 168 Pa. Super.
446, 79 A.2d 121 (1951); Ford Motor Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Comm'n, 191
Va. 812, 63 S.E.2d 28 (1951).
10. Supra note 9.
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on which the Ohio Administrator had relied in denying the claims in
the first instance, along with Chrysler Corporation v. Smith," which
was overruled. Nevertheless, the Ohio court concluded that all of
the decisions upholding the right to benefits, notwithstanding evi-
dence of integration, could be distinguished on their facts. The Park
case was dismissed mainly on the basis that the Michigan statute12
contained a preamble setting forth the legislative purpose and a pro-
vision allowing benefits to employees disinterested in the strike, not-
withstanding their employment in the same factory, establishment, or
other premises. In the Adamski case, Judge Deeds, in a strong dis-
senting opinion, 13 took a much more realistic position in urging that
the Park case was entirely inconsistent with the result reached by the
majority; he also quoted at length from the Michigan Supreme
Court's opinion in support of his view that the lower court should
have been reversed. The reference in the majority opinion to judi-
cial legislation is particularly apropos to the very decision which the
majority reached. It is rather difficult to think of a better illustra-
tion of reading "into a statute a legislative meaning or intent, which
digresses from the scope and application thereof, reasonably demon-
strated by the language used,"' 4 in the words of the court itself. The
ordinary meaning of the word "establishment" is clearly limited to a
single, physical place, having reference to such things as an industrial
plant, institution, place of business or residence (including the appur-
tenances attached thereto or contained therein).15 This meaning is
even more evident when the other two terms with which it is used, are
considered. The word "factory" dearly refers to a single, local
place, and the reference to other "premises" imparts an equally local
meaning. There is no reason apparent in the statute for giving the
word which occurs between these two terms, a broader or different
meaning. It is safe to say that the draftsman who first adopted this
phrase in connection with the labor dispute disqualification, had no
notion of the far flung inter-city or inter-state connotation which some
would attribute to the simple term "establishment."' 6  The court, as
do most others who ascribe such unusual scope to the word "establish-
ment," carefully but freely referred to the two places as "plants," the
11. 297 Mich. 438, 298 N.W. 87 (1941), frequently cited by the advocates of the functional
integration test.
12. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 421.29 (Supp. 1952).
13. Adamski v. State, 108 Ohio App. 198, 220, 161 N.E.2d 907, 922, (1959) (dissenting
opinion).
14. Id. at 204, 161 N.E.2d at 913.
15. BLACK, LAW DIcTIoNARY 643 (4th ed. 1951).
16. An observation based upon the writer's acquaintance with the staff which worked on the
earliest version of the "draft bill" which was used by most, if not all, of the states, in some
degree, in enacting the first unemployment insurance laws in 1937 and 1938. The original
Wisconsin law is the only state statute which predated the draft bill drawn by the members of
the staff of the original Social Security Board for the assistance of the states in enacting legis-
lation to comply with the basic conditions of the federal act.
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Toledo plant and the Hamtramck plant. But how is this different
from the term "factory"? Actually, these are factories, and this is
the term which should have been applied, rather than the term which
was simply meant to refer to business places other than those used in
manufacturing.17
In this connection, it is interesting to note that the same term is
used in the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act,' and has been inter-
preted under that statute in the manner adopted by the majority of
the state courts in connection with the unemployment compensation
laws. The Labor Department's definition of the term as being one
particular business premises, has been upheld by the federal courts."0
The absence of a preamble containing a legislative declaration of
policy should have no effect whatsoever upon the decision. The pur-
pose of the Ohio law is certainly no different without a preamble, and
section 4141.46 of the Ohio code, directing a liberal construction,
should be given recognition. The liberality referred to in this sec-
tion, it should be noted, relates to the statute's primary function of
providing benefits to the 'unemployed, and not to a liberal construc-
tion of the disqualification provisions so as to prevent benefit pay-
ments. It is equally of no moment that the Ohio law does not con-
tain a provision allowing benefits to disinterested employees in the
same plant or factory, such as the Michigan law contains. The omis-
sion of such a provision should hardly be a basis for changing the
meaning of the disqualification clause.
In the McGee case,20 parts produced in the plant at Canton, Ohio,
were shipped to Zanesville, Ohio, for inspection and assembly. When
the Canton plant went out on strike, the parts available at the Zanes-
ville plant were eventually exhausted and lay-offs then occurred in
the latter city, more than ninety miles away. In holding that these
plants constituted one establishment, so as to disqualify the Zanesville
workers, the court in its opinion did not even mention any of the
precedents, for or against such interpretation.
It is never difficult to find evidence of integration between the
plants of any modern corporation. Production in one factory is fre-
quently dependent upon parts from another. It remains to be seen
to what extent the Ohio courts will be willing to apply the functional
integration test to identify plants located in different cities as one es-
tablishment. The majority opinion in the 4damski case gave recog-
17. A "factory" is a building or group of buildings, mill, or workshop used for manufactur-
ing. BLACK, LAW DICTIoNARY 709 (4th ed. 1951). It is often referred to as a manufactur-
ing establishment. Ibid. A "plant" usually refers to the fixtures, machinery and physical
equipment used for production. Id. at 1309. In some states, only the term "establishment"
is used. See Nordling v. Ford Motor Co., 231 Minn. 68, 42 N.W.2d 576 (1950).
18. 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1958).
19. A. H. Phillips, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 490 (1945); McComb v. W. E. Wright Co.,
168 F.2d 40 (6th Cir. 1948).
20. McGee v. Timkin Roller Bearing Co., 161 N.E.2d 905 (Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
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nition to the geographic test, but as a practical matter, in view of the
decisions already rendered, it is difficult to see where this could mean
very much anywhere within the state's boundaries. As to extensions
beyond the Ohio line, there may be a limit which will appear in some
future case. As the purpose of the Unemployment Compensation
Law becomes better understood in this state, it is to be hoped that the
Ohio Supreme Court will eventually consider the question, unless, in
the meantime, the legislature decides to enact its own clarification.
OTHER DISQUALIFICATION PROVISIONS
In a decision considerably more in keeping with the liberal con-
struction admonition of the legislature, the Summit County Common
Pleas Court ruled that a claimant was justified in refusing to accept
work which would have involved employment every fourth Sunday.21
Specifically, the court held that the claimant's refusal to accept an
offer of work made upon this condition was with good cause, within
the meaning of the disqualification provision in section 4141.29
(C) (3) of the Ohio act. The court could also have found that the
work offered was unsuitable within the meaning of this provision,
since suitability is defined in sub-paragraph (E) to include considera-
tion of any risk to the claimant's morals. The claimant simply testi-
fied that she belonged to a Protestant religion that "forbids you from
working on Sunday. ' 2'  The court made a further significant point
that the contract of employment offered was illegal in any event, be-
ing in contravention of section 3773.24 of the code, which prohibits
engaging in common labor on Sunday.23
In Wallace v. Bonded Oil Company,24 it was held that the claim-
ant, who was a part-time student at a divinity school in Springfield,
Ohio, was not a "student regularly attending" an established educa-
tional institution within the meaning of the provision of the Ohio
statute barring such students from receiving unemployment benefits. 5
There was no issue of availability, the evidence indicating that the
claimant was available for work and actively seeking such work in
compliance with section 4141.29 (A) (4), despite his part-time school
21. Wallace v. B.U.C., 160 N.E.2d 580 (Ohio C.P. 1959).
22. Id. at 582.
23. This is the so-called Sunday Law, which had been all but forgotten until a rather recent
campaign in this state to revitalize this rather dormant legislation. The initial impetus seems
to have been furnished by certain business interests, but church groups for the most part have
joined enthusiastically. This point was completely overlooked in the much less enlightened
decision in Lowery v. Administrator, discussed in Teple, Social Security and Public Welfare.
Survey of Ohio Law - 1955, 7 WEST. RES. L. REV. 321, 324 (1956).
24. 162 N.E.2d 172 (Ohio C.P. 1958).
25. OHIo REV. CODE § 4141.29(C) (8), provides that no individual may receive benefits
for the duration of any period of employment where he has "left his most recent work for
the purpose of attending an established educational institution, or is a student regularly attend-
ing an established educational institution during the school term." (Emphasis added.)
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attendance. The claimant's former employment had been at night,
and he had been working full time while he attended divinity school
classes. Claimant testified that actual attendance at lectures was not
always required, and that the claimant was taking four years to com-
plete a normal three-year course. Attending school under these cir-
cumstances, the court held, was not the type of matriculation contem-
plated by the statute disqualifying a "student regularly attending" an
educational institution. The court relied upon Acierno v. General
Fireproofing Company,26 and the decision appears to be a fair appli-
cation of the principle declared by the Ohio Supreme Court in that
case. The court concluded by saying that the claimant's ambition to
advance himself, or his expectation to eventually abandon or change
his current job or trade, was not a basis for disqualification.
STATUTORY PROCEDURE FOR APPEAL
A series of cases has been reported the past year involving the
application of the appeal procedure contained in the Unemployment
Compensation act. By the express terms thereof, any interested
party (which, of course, includes the claimant) may, within ten days
after notice of the decision of the Board of Review on appeal from a
referee, mailed to such party's last known post office address, file no-
tice with such Board "of intention to appeal any such decision or
order of the Board adversely affecting such party to a court of com-
mon pleas and request a rehearing by the Board. ' 7  In four cases,
claimants were tripped by the statutory requirement for this last ad-
ministrative step, prior to the amendment last year eliminating this
step.
In Stewart v. Administrator,28 the court held that the limitation
of time within which the last appeal before the Board of Review is
allowed, was jurisdictional. The notice of the Board's decision had
been mailed July 16, 1956, and on August 3, 1956, the claimant filed
a notice of appeal with the Clerk of Courts. 9 Since the claimant had
thus failed to give notice of his intent to appeal and to request a re-
26. 166 Ohio St. 539, 144 N.E.2d 201 (1957), discussed in Teple, Social Security and Public
Welfare, Survey of Ohio Law - 1957, 9 WEST. RES. L. REv. 361 (1958).
27. This is the fifth and last step of the administrative procedure involved in handling a
disputed claim, as outlined in OHIO REV. CODE 5 4141.28. This section is long and detailed,
providing first for initial consideration of the claim by the Administrator. The second step
is the application for reconsideration by the Administrator. Following this, appeal to a referee
is provided as the third step. The fourth step consists of consideration by the Board of
Review. Previously the Board afforded an opportunity for a rehearing before the claim
could be appealed to the courts. At this fifth step, on reconsideration before the Board
of Review, either party could request and obtain a hearing de novo. For a discussion of the
amendment, see Administrative Law and Procedure section, pp. 336-37 supra.
28. 107 Ohio App. 86, 153 N.B.2d 332 (1958).
29. Part of the confusion arises from the provision in the succeeding paragraph for appeal to
the court within thirty days after notice of the Board's decision on reconsideration. Many
were undone by their failure to note the two considerations by the Board, previously required.
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hearing within ten days after the mailing of the notice of the Board's
initial decision, it was held that the lower court had no authority to
direct, on remand, that such hearing be had, the time allowed by the
statute for such notice and request having already passed.
In Mitchell v. State,3O a letter addressed jointly to the Governor
and the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, in which the claim-
ant stated that he had just cause for quitting his job and outlined the
circumstances in some detail, but in which there was no statement of
an intent to appeal to the court or a request for rehearing, was held
to be insufficient to comply with the notice required by section 4141.28
after an adverse decision by the Board of Review.
In House v. B.U.C.,3' the decision of the Board of Review on ini-
tial appeal from the referee was dated September 20, 1956, and a
notice of appeal therefrom, filed with the Clerk of Courts twenty-
eight days later, was held not to be within the ten day period allowed
for request for reconsideration and was, therefore, insufficient as a
basis for further appeal.
In each of these three cases, there was an obvious oversight of
the fifth step in the administrative procedure afforded and required
by the act. This omission, according to these decisions, is fatal. As
noted in the court's opinion in the House case, any one not expe-
rienced in statutory interpretation could get lost with ease, and the
court further observed that it was difficult to understand "just why
five separate considerations and reconsiderations should be required
to finally have a claim submitted to a court where an interested party
feels aggrieved by the decision of an administrative agency in a mat-
ter that should be decided with dispatch. ' 3  With sound perception,
however, the court said that this was a "legislative matter."
The decision in WJ/inans v. Administrator33 deserves special note.
In that case, the Board of Review denied the claim on initial appeal
from the referee, notice of which was mailed April 8, 1957. The
claimant's attorney then addressed a letter to the B.U.C., dated April
18, 1957, indicating that it had been anticipated that the Board of
Review would permit the introduction of evidence and testimony in
support of the claim.3 4 He proceeded to characterize the adverse de-
cision of the Board as unjust in view of the information disclosed to
him by the claimant. The letter thereupon requested a rehearing and
an opportunity to present evidence, indicating that his only other al-
ternative would be an appeal to the court within thirty days and ask-
ing for a prompt reply for this reason. The letter concluded with the
30. 107 Ohio App. 447, 153 N.E.2d 341 (1958).
31. 107 Ohio App. 400, 153 N.E.2d 337 (1958).
32. Id. at 404, 153 N.E.2d at 340.
33. 107 Ohio App. 553, 155 N.E.2d 468 (1958).
34. This is exactly what would have occurred if the precise notice required by the statute had
been filed.
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attorney's statement that it was his sincere hope and desire that the
matter could be disposed of without the necessity of litigation beyond
the Board.
The court held that this was not a sufficient notice of intent to
appeal to the court, the word "intent" or "purpose" not appearing in
the letter. The court conceded that the language used might connote
a threat of litigation, but it was held that this was not an adequate
substitute for the precise statement which the statute required. This,
it is submitted, is a case of dotting the "i" a little too precisely. To
the ordinary mortal, the attorney's effort would appear to be an ade-
quate compliance with the statutory terms. He had met one condi-
tion by requesting a rehearing, and came close enough to meeting the
other.
MISCELLANEOUS PROBLEMS
In United Steel Workers v. Doyle,35 the Ohio Supreme Court held
that private unemployment benefits, provided under the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement to supplement public benefits payable
under the state unemployment compensation law, amounted to wages
within the meaning of the statutory definition, 6 so that the state pay-
ments would have to be reduced by the amount of any such private
supplementation. This decision was nullified within a few months
by legislative action which clarified the applicable provisions of the
state law, and specifically authorized the private supplementation of
state benefit payments.38
An opportunity to apply the "lockout" exception to the labor dis-
pute disqualification in the Ohio statute 9 arose in Zanesville Rapid
Transit, Incorporated v. Bailey.40  Where the employer was in ob-
vious financial difficulty and announced its plight well in advance of
the expiration of its prior collective bargaining agreement, subse-
quently insisting upon a ten per cent wage cut as a condition of fur-
ther employment, the court found that the employer's position was
neither unreasonable nor coercive, and, therefore, did not amount to
a "lockout" so as to relieve its employees of the effect of the labor
dispute disqualification. The decision of the Administrator denying
35. 168 Ohio St. 324, 154 N.X.2d 623 (1958).
36. OHIo REv. CODE 4141.01(G).
37. The majority of the court chose to follow the reasoning of the Administrator of the state
agency in preference to the views of both lower courts, but Justices Taft and Zimmerman filed
a vigorous and well-reasoned dissent. 168 Ohio St. 324, 328, 154 N.E.2d 623, 627 (1958).
For a more detailed discussion of the decision, and the background pertaining to this matter,
see Teple, Supplemental Unemployment Benefits, 20 Omo ST. L.J. 583 (1959).
38. Amended S.B. No. 53, 103d General Assembly of Ohio (1959), amending OHIo REV.
CODE §§ 4141.35, .36. Most other states had achieved the same result by administrative in-
terpretation or by rulings of the Attorney General.
39. OHIo REv. CODE § 4141.29(C) (2).
40. 168 Ohio St. 351, 155 NE.2d 202 (1958).
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benefits for the period of unemployment prior to reaching a new
agreement, was thus affirmed.4'
The court adopted the standard definition of the term "lockout,"
described as meaning a "cessation of the furnishing of work to em-
ployees or a withholding of work from them in an effort to get for
the employer more desirable terms. ' 4 2  It was recognized that an
actual, physical closing of the place of employment was not always
necessary. Apparently the court did not consider this a bilateral ces-
sation of work, although peaceful negotiations for the new agree-
ment were still in progress and the court's statement of the facts does
not seem to preclude this possibility. In such cases, it has been held
that the resulting unemployment was not due to a labor dispute.43
The rare question of when a worker is unemployed arose in Par-
ent v. Administrator,44 wherein a variety store operator, during
the period covered by his claim for benefits, spent about twenty hours
weekly in his store and ten hours seeking employment. The store
sustained a net loss during this period, except for a single week during
which a total profit of two dollars was realized. The court held that
the operator was not working for wages under a contract of hire and
was, therefore, unemployed. The more difficult question, of course,
is whether he performed any services which would prevent his being
considered "totally unemployed" within the meaning of the statute.45
If his work in the store were considered services, however, he still
might be considered partially unemployed in view of his nominal earn-
ings and the limited number of hours spent in the store.
In Curtiss-Wright Corporation v. Tichenor,46 it was held that the
41. Stressing the fact that the employer was a public utility and dependent upon the city
council in negotiating a franchise to operate, the court nevertheless indicated that it might
have been inclined to reach a different result if the employer's request to continue work at
reduced wages had been made unexpectedly and without an opportunity for prior negotiations.
42. 168 Ohio St. 351, 354, 155 N.E.2d 202, 205 (1958). Ohio is one of seven states hav-
ing the express lockout exception, the other six being Connecticut, Minnesota, Pennsylvania,
West Virginia, Arkansas, and Mississippi. For other applications of this prevision, all of
them favorable to the claimants on the basis of evidence of more affirmative employer action,
see Bucko v. J. F. Quest Foundry Co., 229 Minn. 131, 38 N.W.2d 223 (1949); Kendall
Refining Co. v. Board of Review, 184 Pa. Super. 95, 132 A.2d 749 (1957); Burger v. Board
of Review, 168 Pa. Super 89, 77 A.2d 737 (1951). In at least one other state, a similar
result has been reached without an express provision excepting lockouts from the labor dispute
disqualification. Bunny's Waffle Shop v. Commission, 24 Cal. 2d 735, 151 P.2d 224 (1944)
(where wages were cut twenty-five percent and the employers went from a five- to a six-day
week with split shifts in an apparent effort to force the union to recognize a newly-organized
employers' association). Compare McKinley v. California Employment Stabilization Comm'n,
34 Cal. 2d 238, 209 P.2d 602 (1949); A. Borchman Sons v. Carpenter, 166 Neb. 322, 89
N.E.2d 123 (1958); Olaf Nelson Const. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 121 Utah 525, 243 P.2d
951 (1952).
43. In re Cohen, 283 App. Div. 143, 126 N.Y.S.2d 648 (1953); United States Coal Co. v.
Board of Review, 66 Ohio App. 329, 32 N.E.2d 763 (1940).
44. 160 N.E.2d 560 (Ohio C.P. 1959).
45. OHIO REV. CODE § 4141.01(M).
46. 160 N.E.2d 573 (Ohio C.P. 1957).
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